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A B S T R A C T
This paper presents an innovative approach to the responsible use of quantitative analysis when dealing with the
governance of sustainability. Rather than using complicated models which try to predict and control the future
evolution of complex adaptive systems, quantitative story-telling is proposed to check, first of all, the plausibility of
proposed policies. As a case study, we check the plausibility of ‘a radical decarbonization of the European economy
based on a quick deployment of alternative sources of electrical energy generation’. Although our case study includes a
high-level set of quantitative results, it is primarily methodological. The procedure of quantitative story-telling in-
cludes: (1) identification of the narratives used to inform policy; (2) identification of the relevant factors determining
the feasibility, viability and desirability of expected results; (3) a quantitative analysis which falsifies at least one of
these three factors, indicating an implausibility of the expected results; and (4) identification of knowledge gaps in the
existing discussions over the issue. The modern European energy system does need an urgent and radical transfor-
mation. However, before imposing drastic and ambitious policies, it is essential to check the quality of the diagnosis.
Our analysis flags the existence of a few reasons for concern with regard to the current story-telling.
1. Introduction
The European Commission maintains a flagship initiative to trans-
form the European Union into a resource efficient and low-carbon
economy [1]. It contends that, within a few decades, economic growth
and energy use must be decoupled. Simultaneously, it contends that an
improvement of both economic competitiveness and energy security
must be realized. Unprecedented societal determination and commit-
ment would be needed to realize such a heroic energy transition [2].
Entire sectors of the economy would necessarily reinvent themselves
inside a very short period of time. A reflection on the Commission's
narrative choice reveals, however, that their ambitious energy policy
package for the European Union is based exclusively on structural and
technological changes. Accordingly, the contextual understanding of
‘sectoral reinvention’ is both reductionist and incomplete [3–5].
Perhaps more worrisome than this observation is the expectation
that the Commission's transition is to be achieved by a series of
technological innovations driven by the invisible hand of the market.
The expensive transition experiment done in Germany – the
Energiewende – is an illustration of this worry. Indeed, according to the
German Federal Court of Auditors, the Energiewende has thus far been
“characterized by inefficiency” [6]. In concluding statement, the Court
states that the German Ministry of Economics and Energy has “so far not
taken any steps to ensure that inefficient programmes which at the same time
contribute little to energy transition are phased out” (emphasis added) [6].
At the same time, significant economic investments (nearly €200 bn) in
alternative energy sources in Germany has led to the highest electricity
prices in Europe [7] without significantly reducing emissions levels [8].
This experience, including societal hesitance to question the decisions
of the Energiewende policies, flags the existence of a systemic problem
with the quality of the scientific evidence used to inform the process of
policymaking when dealing with complex issues [9]. Solutions inspired
by economics, such of the levelized cost of electricity – based on the
assumption that “electricity output is perfectly interchangeable and
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homogeneous” [10], have not yet solved the problem [11].
The example of the Energiewende illustrates the risk of informing
policy with an incomplete hegemonic storyline. In particular, the
Energiewende’s storyline is dominated by the representation of the
performance of an electrical grid based on economic narratives [12].
Alas, when addressing sustainability issues it is unavoidable to face
“wicked problems” [13] entailing the coexistence of a virtually infinite
set of relevant issues that should be considered simultaneously. When
non-equivalent dimensions and scales of analysis and legitimate but
divergent expressions of concerns must be considered simultaneously, it
becomes difficult to derive an uncontested definition of what should be
considered rational and what should be considered fact [14–16]. The
Cartesian dream of prediction and control [17,18] clashes against the
complexity [13] associated with the sustainability predicament. A si-
tuation is created where ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes
high and decisions urgent’ and the use of science for policy becomes
problematic [19]. In general, when dealing with large doses of un-
certainty, a massive generation of expectations translates into a poli-
tical activity with the goal of mobilizing resources in order to ‘colonize’
the future of the society [20]. Jasanoff and Kim refer to this generation
of societal expectations as the establishment of ‘social imaginaries’.
Institutional imaginaries, they further say, often come with technolo-
gical promises [21].
The establishment of a sociotechnical imaginary is an influential act
insofar as it creates and manages future expectations [22]. Expecta-
tions, through their creation of “dynamism and momentum” [20], play
an essential role in “guiding technological innovation and sustainability
transitions” [23]. In the context of a sustainability transition, an ag-
gressive mobilization of expectations translates into an ideological en-
dorsement of justification narratives. Once expectations have attained a
normative status, they need not be justified nor reflected upon [24].
Any myths that may or may not exist in support of normative ex-
pectations are then no longer given space for critical and hesitative
reflection [23,25]. In the case of the Energiewende, a massive set of
expectations has been created. Conflicting those lofty expectations with
widespread failures has recently lead to substantial disillusionment. To
be sure, Kay Scheller, the president of the German Federal Court of
Auditors, is currently concerned that “voters could soon lose all faith in
the government because of [the Energiewende’s] massive failure” [12].
Given their urgent nature, societal disillusionment with a renewable
energy transition is quite an unfortunate and undesirable thing.
Janda and Toupizi [26] suggest that learning-type storylines can
gainfully problematize hero-type storylines such as those of the Eur-
opean Commission and Energiewende. Indeed, learning-type storylines
are useful for challenging hegemonic narratives. The intent of pro-
blematizing with learning storylines is not, however, to undermine.
Rather, the intent of problematizing is to balance and develop the
standing discussion. The result of such investigation may be seen to
have a positive discursive feedback and lead valuably to the co-creation
of increasingly robust transition imaginaries [27,28]. We are convinced
that a more informed discussion about problems and potential troubles
of energy transitions will benefit all social actors and allow a better
policy framing through consideration of different, yet equally legit-
imate, proposals of sustainability policies.
To deal with this challenge, we propose a new approach to the use
of quantitative analysis termed ‘quantitative story-telling’. Quantitative
story-telling aims towards a more responsible use of quantitative ana-
lysis as it informs decision making. In this approach, no solutions to the
problem (whose problem?) are proposed. No improvements (for
whom?) are suggested. Quantitative story-telling aims simply to check
the quality of an elected story-telling and related policy narratives. In
this paper, quantitative story-telling is applied to test the plausibility of
the claim that ‘in two or three decades, it will be possible to scale-up the
supply of intermittent sources of electricity (wind- and solar-based) to
obtain a significant decarbonization of European economies’.
Considering recent attention given to the failures of the Energiewende,
the decision to explore the plausibility of that claim is timely and ad-
vantageous. Importantly, the fact that we check the plausibility of this
story does not mean that we endorse or oppose its problem framing or
any of the proposed solutions. We do not necessarily endorse nor op-
pose a centralized electrical grid based on wind and solar primary en-
ergy sources.
The text of the paper is organized as described in the following.
Firstly, we introduce the concept of quantitative story-telling and how
we conceptualize the problems associated with the scaling-up of the
supply of electrical energy generated by intermittent sources into the
actual typologies of electrical grids. Secondly, we provide a quantitative
analysis of the plausibility of the proposed strategies for a quick tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy based on a massive surge in the supply
of alternative energy. Thirdly and finally, a quantitative story-telling
based on the analysis of the results suggests that there are serious
concerns about the claims endorsed by European Union policies. This
result is intended as a warning that a political strategy based on the
mobilization of expectations about results that are not reachable in the
promised time horizon may lead to the choice of unwise and unfair
policies.
2. Methods and problem conceptualization
2.1. A new method of quantitative analysis
Any macro-level assessment which involves the scaling-up of elec-
trical energy generation depends largely on its specific expectations of
growth in the consumption of electrical energy. Relevant assessments
are required to consider determining factors of both demand and
supply. On the demand side, the growth of various unique load forms is
of primary importance. For example, industrial, transportation, com-
mercial and residential components are frequently individuated. On the
supply side, the factors determining the availability of resources are of
primary importance. For example, differentiating conventional and
renewable resources and consideration of the growth of transmission
and distribution infrastructures are both frequent procedures. Even
more complex than these primarily engineering aspects, however, is the
analysis of how changes in the demand and changes in the supply can
be integrated during a sector transition when considering several di-
mensions of analysis. Crucial dimensions of analysis include the desir-
ability of the specific mix of social practices as well as that mix's re-
sulting economic viability and biophysical feasibility. Such an
assessment requires characterizing the pattern of electrical energy end
uses on the demand side versus adjustments taking place in conven-
tional sources. In turn, this requires consideration of the economics and
financials of fossil and nuclear fuel as well as renewable energy sources,
the scaling-up of the generation of renewable sources against the
variability of intermittent supply and the consequent problems of
transmission and distribution congestion in respective networks.
For all these reasons, an energy sector transition is a very compli-
cated ordeal. Among other aspects, it requires a significant ‘rewiring’ of
the functional relations between and within sectors (i.e. a new sector
coupling), a re-arrangement of social practices (associated with the
patterns of consumption in both paid and non-paid work sectors), a
change in existing technologies, a revolution in the economic business
models and a re-thinking of institutional regulation. Put differently, the
electrical grid will have to go for ‘something completely different’.
Necessary changes will be determined in an unpredictable way by the
effects determined by a series of impredicative relations (chicken-egg
causality dilemmas) over drivers of changes only observable across
different dimensions and levels of analysis. When trying to predict the
evolution of this type of system – a complex adaptive system – and
especially when dealing with radical re-adjustments, one must expect
the presence of large doses of uncertainty hampering prediction and
control [29,30]. While conventional economic analysis does play an
important role in determining the viability of changes, it does not
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contain a relevant set of methods pertinent to the assessment of the
biophysical feasibility of changes. In the words of H.T. Odum, given a
technology, a “gallon of gasoline will power a car the same distance no
matter what its price” [31]. By implication, within the corpus of learning-
type storylines, economic narratives must be complemented with other
narrative varieties. A check on the feasibility (compatibility with bio-
physical constraints), the viability (compatibility with economic and
technical constraints) and the desirability (compatibility with institu-
tions, normative values and aspirations of the actors in the society)
requires an integrated use of different disciplinary lenses.
Assuming all this to be the situation, a responsible use of quanti-
tative analysis entails a change in the purpose of the analysis. Rather
than crunching numbers to identify an ostensibly optimal course of
action or to predict future states of the system, it is wiser to use
quantification to check the robustness of the story-telling associated
with a given policy [9,32]. This approach, proposed and tested in the
European project Moving Towards Adaptive Governance in Complexity
(MAGIC) [33], is called ‘quantitative story-telling’. In addition to
complexity science, the process of quantitative story-telling draws
philosophically on post-normal science for governance [29,34]. In post-
normal science for governance, the quality of analytical outcomes de-
pends on clarifying the choices that have shaped the content of the
evidence base and the modes of analysis considered as salient and
credible. Quantitative story-telling is not, therefore, concerned with
refinement of the minutiae of existing dynamical models. Instead, it is
used to explore counterfactuals of hegemonic hero stories and question
whether existing science-policy consensuses are ignoring crucial pro-
blems by taking too narrow a view of the challenges to be faced.
Quantitative story-telling is used in this paper to check the plausibility
of the proposed set of strategies anticipating a quick transition to a low-
carbon economy based on intermittent sources of electrical energy.
In the rest of this section, we illustrate the pre-analytical choices
that have shaped our quantitative analysis. We do this in order to make
transparent our framing of the issue and the consequent identification
of the relations to be considered when checking the plausibility of the
chosen story-telling [35].
2.2. “The” peculiar, policy relevant characteristic of electrical energy
2.2.1. Accounting for electrical energy
Different forms of energy present different challenges and require
different accounting techniques. The form of energy known as electrical
energy happens to be convenient, versatile, reliable and precise.
Technologies which convert electrical energy to other useful forms of
energy – mechanical, chemical and thermal, to name a few – are,
moreover, highly efficient. All these characteristics are of course highly
desirable for society. Electrical energy does, however, have a funda-
mental drawback in that it is a flow of energy. Flow resources are not
directly useful unless they are either put to immediate use or stored.
One could claim that electrical energy is “better” than thermal energy
in the same way one could claim that ice cream is “better” than a
cookie. While ice cream may be more delicious at the point of con-
sumption, if not eaten on the spot, ice cream will melt down and be-
come useless. The ice cream metaphor illustrates how electrical energy
can be considered, at the point of consumption, more user friendly than
chemical energy (e.g. in the case of fossil fuel energy carriers) and
nuclear energy (e.g. in the case of fissile material energy carriers). In
contrast to electrical energy, however, fossil and nuclear fuels are
stocks of energy and therefore allow the generation of flows of energy
whenever a consumer desires. The chemical energy in the tank of a car,
for example, can be used whenever the owner decides to use the car. On
the contrary, electrical energy requires the simultaneous operation of a
device generating it and a device utilizing it.
Due to this difference, electrical energy's flow aspect implies the need
for a high-resolution spatial and temporal balance between its supply and
demand. Meaningful energy accounting measures must, therefore, in-
dividuate the specific link to be established in space and time between
power capacity supplying electrical energy and power capacity de-
manding electrical energy. The consumption of a kWh of electrical en-
ergy is an event that must be defined after adopting local scales of space
and time. Indeed, the long-term averaged value of a quantity of elec-
tricity loses the relevant information needed to characterize the social
desirability, economic viability and biophysical feasibility of electrical
energy. GWh per year, a common metric in energy accounting, has this
drawback. To make an analogy between GWh per year and the ice cream
metaphor, for a person selling ice-cream cones, information about the
availability of one tonne of ice cream per year does not guarantee that
this quantity of ice cream will be accessible in the right quantity, at the
right moment and in the right place. In contrast, meaningful energy
accounting for stocks of energy (cookies in the ice cream metaphor), may
appropriately be made at a relatively coarse spatial-temporal scale. GJ of
gasoline stocks per year at the national scale, for example. In summary,
successfully accounting for stocks of energy (e.g. fossil fuels) generally
requires significantly less spatial-temporal precision than successfully
accounting for flows of energy (e.g. electrical energy).
The need for a high-resolution spatial and temporal balance be-
tween the supply and demand of electrical energy additionally allows
for the definition of a metric of quality of any given watt-hours. In
relation to regulatory aspects, three types of power capacity for pro-
ducing electrical energy may be identified: (i) base-load (predictable,
but supply is difficult to regulate); (ii) peak-load (predictable and easy
to regulate); and (iii) intermittent (not predictable and supply cannot be
regulated, only curtailed). The characteristics of these three forms of
power capacity determine the quality of the watt-hours produced. By
implication, from an engineering point of view and contrary to what is
assumed by business-as-usual economic analyses based on price, dif-
ferent types of kWh can and should be distinguished due to implications
in their possible use in the grid. When considering existing electrical
grids, predictable and regulatable watt-hours are of the highest use-
fulness in matching supply and demand. It is, therefore, reasonable to
expect that the cost of production of peak-load watt-hours is higher
than that of base-load watt-hours. For the same reason, it is reasonable
to expect that the cost of production of base-load watt-hours is higher
than that of intermittent watt-hours. From this realization we can de-
duce that the fact that watt-hours produced by intermittent power ca-
pacity (e.g. wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels) may be cheaper in
terms of fixed and operating costs than watt-hours produced by other
forms of power capacity is not by itself a particularly relevant piece of
information for the design of a national electrical grid. These points
may be summarized in the crucial, yet in the case of contemporary
energy accounting for social systems frequently overlooked, realization
that not all watt-hours of energy are the same. Table 1 summarizes key
Table 1
Characterization of performance factors for different types of electric power plants. Usage rates based off [36], capacity factors calculated from the datasets used in
Section 3 of this article (annual-national averages). Section 2.3 provides additional theoretical background to the content of this table.
Type Power capacity Gross usage Capacity factor Grid demand Utilization factor Energy-to-power ratio
Baseloaders 1 MW 6000+ h/yr 0.7+ Approx. 100% 0.7+ 6+ GWh/MW
Peakable 1 MW 1000–4000 h/yr 0.1–0.5 Approx. 100% 0.1–0.5 1–4 GWh/MW
Intermittents 1 MW 400–3000 h/yr 0.05–0.3 0–100% 0–0.3 0–3 GWh/MW
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classificatory differences between the three types of power capacity
mentioned. The Capacity factor scales Gross usage based off an 8760-
hour year. Grid demand, in particular for intermittents, defines cur-
tailment. The Utilization factor is directly related to both the Capacity
factor and Grid demand.
2.2.2. Storage
It follows from the flow nature of electrical energy that, within the
existing pattern of production and consumption of electrical energy
based on a centralized system of production and distribution, supplied
electrical energy that is not immediately put to use must be either
stored or ‘wasted’. Utility-scale storage is problematic. By using capa-
citors, electrical energy can in fact be directly stored without conver-
sion. Using capacitors (or better, supercapacitors) as a means of utility-
scale energy storage in electrical grids, however, is not feasible neither
currently not in the foreseeable future. Supercapacitors self-discharge
completely in just 3-4 days, a self-discharge rate two orders of magni-
tude higher than that of, for example, lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries. The
energy density of supercapacitors is furthermore relatively low, at least
an order of magnitude less than that of Li-ion batteries [37,38]. To
overcome these practical incompatibilities, electrical energy must in-
stead be converted to another form of energy in order to be effectively
stored. To name a few of the more common forms, energy might be
stored at the utility-scale in the form of mechanical energy (e.g. fly-
wheels), gravitational energy (e.g. pumped hydro), thermal energy or
chemical energy (batteries, e.g. flow, lead-acid, Li-ion, sodium or zinc
batteries).
By far the most prevalent utility-scale energy storage technology to
date is pumped hydro, covering roughly 96% of storage capacity
globally [39]. In the developed world, however, relatively limited ex-
pansion potential exists in terms of new pumped hydro sites. Most of
the low-hanging fruit locations have already been developed. Other
energy storage technologies are also rapidly becoming cost competitive.
In particular, the battery family of storage technology has been gaining
momentum in high-level policy [39]. Many outlook analyses also focus
on batteries. Lazard's annual Levelized Cost of Storage Analysis, for ex-
ample, goes so far as to omit entirely mechanical, gravitational and
thermal energy storage technologies. This omission is a decision based
on their identification of “limited current or future commercial deployment
expectations [for those technologies]” [40]. Bloomberg's New Energy
Outlook similarly maintains a substantial focus on batteries for storage,
although not entirely exclusively like Lazard [41].
2.3. The role of alternative sources in the existing electrical grid
After establishing a baseline understanding of electrical energy,
including its beneficial and problematic aspects as well as its storage
potential, it is meaningful to provide a baseline understanding of al-
ternatives in the electrical grid. The following symbolic equations (Eqs.
(1) and (2)) form a trivial comparison between a conventional fossil
fuel-based electrical grid (Eq. (1)) and an electrical grid with a rela-
tively large quantity of its electrical energy generated from inter-
mittents power capacity (Eq. (2)). In practice, intermittents power ca-
pacity is power capacity converting solar and wind primary energy
sources into electrical energy. Key technologies include solar photo-
voltaic panels and wind turbines. It's also worth noting that the in-
troduction of intermittents power capacity in the electrical grid is by
and large fueling the contemporary renewables energy transition. Fol-
lowing Table 1, Eqs. (1) and (2) represent a symbolic, macro-char-
acterization critical to the issue of scaling-up alternatives in the elec-
trical grid.× =PC GU GEel (1)× × = +PC GU GD TE WEel el (2)
In Eqs. (1) and (2), PC stands for power capacity (generally nameplate
e.g. measured in megawatts), GU stands for gross usage (the total time of
use over given a period e.g. measured in hours/year), and GEel stands
for gross electrical energy (gross generated e.g. measured in gigawatt-
hours/year). In Eq. (2), GD stands for grid demand (the demand, placed
by the grid, on physically identifiable power capacity represented as a
percentage of generated electrical energy), TEel stands for transmitted
electrical energy and WEel stands for wasted electrical energy. GEel is
equivalent to the sum of TEel and WEel. Lastly, in relation to the pre-
vious Table 1, Eq. (1) is analogous to an extensive representation of
utilization factor in the case of 100% grid demand. Eq. (2) is analogous to
an extensive representation of utilization factor in the case grid demand is
less than 100%.
The predicament of an electrical grid with high intermittents pe-
netration is that intermittents power capacity is constrained by both GU
and GD when not given grid priority. In this situation, curtailment ty-
pically occurs when curtailment is economical. As a result, GU is lower
than it would be if determined only by natural constraints and WEel
increases. In other words, observed utilization factors decrease in re-
lation to corresponding capacity factors. On the other hand, when in-
termittents power capacity is given grid priority, only GU constrains the
equation. In that circumstance, however, intermittents power capacity
will have either: (i) forced the curtailment of base-load power capacity
(leading to an increase in losses at the system level similar to the pre-
vious case); (ii) created an additional requirement for peak-load power
capacity capable of compensating low-quality supply of electrical en-
ergy from intermittents with high-quality supply of electrical energy; or
(iii) created a situation of unfulfilled demand (major power outages). In
Section 3 a story-telling following a major scaling-up of intermittents
power capacity will be explored, the GD estimated, and the option
space around WEel and GU discussed.
In summary, mitigating the unwelcome effects which result from the
injection of large quantities of a ‘low-quality’ supply of electrical energy
in the electrical grid (the effect of intermittents integration) is an ex-
ceptionally delicate task. Subjective decisions must be made by elec-
trical grid operators. In general, increasing the temporal ability for a
base-load system subcomponent to dispatch (increasing its ability to
ramp power output) causes that subcomponent to suffer in terms of
thermodynamic efficiency, capital investment and operational invest-
ment. The solution of peak-load power capacity, the classic example of
which is open-cycle gas turbines, is both relatively expensive in fi-
nancial terms and relatively inefficient in thermodynamic terms.
2.4. The importance of adopting a relational framework
Up until this point, Section 2 has described how the large-scale
accommodation of alternatives in a national-scale, centralized electrical
grid implies the need for any or all of: (i) a considerable non-inter-
mittent operating reserve; (ii) a considerable energy storage ability; or
(iii) a considerable change in the social practices creating the demand
for electrical energy. Whereas options (i) and (ii) are structural changes,
option (iii) includes an important component of functional change. In
order to anticipate, in a holistic manner, the large-scale accommodation
of alternatives in a national-scale electrical grid, a methodology capable
of coordinating both structural and functional analyses is, therefore, a
prerequisite. By extension, reductionist approaches (which, by defini-
tion, ignore function) miss part of the picture.
By shifting the analytical focus from epiphenomena (a non-causal
byproduct – a simple recombination of the same structural elements) to
phenomena, the adoption of a relational analytical framework proves a
radical departure from reductionist science. Relational analysis is cen-
tral to the methodology of this contribution's analysis [42]. In the re-
lational mindset, and indeed in quantitative story-telling, structural
elements are considered instances (specific realizations) of a system's
functional relations. According to Rosen, conventional dynamical
modeling does not adhere to these methods. Instead, dynamical mod-
eling makes a dangerous claim that “a sufficiently elaborate
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characterization of [a system's] structural detail will automatically lead to a
functional understanding of [that system's] behaviors” [43].
To illustrate the point, no level of material description of structures
used to generate peak-load electrical energy (e.g. open-cycle gas tur-
bines vs. the use of hydropower) and structures used to consume peak-
load electrical energy (e.g. certain consumer appliances) is sufficient to
create a robust understanding of the inherently functional, social de-
mand for peak-load electrical energy in the first place [44]. Similarly,
no understanding of the functional, social demand for peak-load elec-
trical energy suffices to create a robust understanding of the in-
stantiating structures. Both descriptions are inextricably needed and
together they form an impredicative relation. In summary, social en-
ergy systems are characterized by the existence of inherently irre-
ducible, impredicative definitions. They are, by extension, non-simul-
able (no largest model) and not purely synthetic. Effectively, they are
complex adaptive systems [45]. The recognition of this point formats
the results generated in Section 3 and frames the discussion made in
Section 4.
3. Our quantitative analysis
3.1. Goal of the analysis
Our exercise in quantitative story-telling investigates additional
factors which could be used to inform policies such as the Energiewende.
We try to put ourselves in the shoes of a grid planner with the goal of
integrating intermittent sources of electricity into the existing German
(and Spanish) electrical grid. We then use quantitative analysis to ask
whether grid problems, such as those experienced in the Energiewende,
could have been anticipated. In order to investigate these concerns, we
anticipate a scaling-up of annual wind and solar generation in Germany
and Spain to what would be 100% of the current annual electrical grid
demand for each country. While the case study is primarily illustrative
in purpose, it does reflect current policies. In Spain, the most recent
legal proposals make plans for 100% of the nation's electrical energy to
be sourced from renewable primary energy sources by 2050 [46]. In
Germany, the Renewable Energy Act states that renewable primary
energy sources should fulfill “at least 80% of gross electricity consump-
tion” by 2050 [47]. In order to fulfill their part of the Paris Agreement,
however, Germany will likely need to have 100% renewables in the
electrical grid by just 2040 [48].
Admittedly, intermittent solar and wind primary energy sources do
not fully encompass ‘renewable energy’. Indeed, hydro and biomass
currently account for 10–12% of the net electrical energy generation in
Germany and Spain [49]. As previously noted, however, both hydro
and biomass have markedly limited expansion potential [48,50]. While
neglecting hydro and biomass expansion potential introduces error to
the results, the margin of error introduced by their omission is in-
substantial in comparison with other analysis uncertainties. For ex-
ample, electric vehicle uptake is widely predicted to force a major in-
crease in electrical grid demand over both the medium- and long-terms
(2030 and 2050, respectively). However, uncertainties surrounding the
exact degree of electric vehicle uptake prohibit the precise character-
ization of changes in overall grid demand [51]. As a result, anticipa-
tions of grid demand in the medium- and long-term in e.g. the United
Kingdom have fluctuated no less than 100% in just the past two years
precisely due to changing estimates of electric vehicle uptake [52,53].
The future of our electrical grids is a highly uncertain ordeal.
An additional, final remark is that the enclosed analysis embarks
from a perspective of national security. From the perspective of national
security, in the occasion of a failure event either an increasing amount
of contingency power capacity (e.g. backup power plants or storage)
must be provided within national boundaries or the national social
demand profile must accommodate. As before, these assumptions re-
present just one possible, pessimistic future. Still, they are not entirely
far-fetched. Indeed, the issue of security of supply in the electrical grid
has encouraged many European states (including both Germany and
Spain) to implement substantial capacity mechanisms in recent years
[54,55]. Such mechanisms stand chiefly in contrast to alternative vi-
sions of a highly cooperative European super-grid.
In summary, three main objectives of the entailed analysis are: (i) to
explore scale issues of intermittent renewable primary energy sources
in the electrical grid; (ii) to illustrate how a relational analysis approach
may be used to inform electrical grid futures; and (iii) to provide an
example of how electrical grid option spaces may be established. To
achieve these objectives, the extent of the anticipated worst annual
failure event is detailed at various consumer guarantee and confidence
levels. Related to the worst annual failure event, the maximal in-
stantaneous power gap and integrated energy gap – both critical aspects
of contingency planning – are calculated. These numerical results are
then discussed from a structural-functional perspective.
3.2. Datasets
Spain and Germany were selected as exploratory cases due to their
status as countries undergoing rapid renewable energy transitions. In
the global context, and in both absolute and relative terms, both
countries are leaders in the use of intermittent primary renewable en-
ergy sources (wind and solar). Table 2 introduces the datasets used in
this case study to detail electrical energy production. In general, the
data is characterized by a high degree of completeness in the sense very
few data points were missing or contestably outliers. A more detailed
explanation of data fidelity may be found in Appendix A. While the data
actually reflects electrical grid demand, it proxies total feasible re-
newable electrical energy generation remarkably well. To date, for
Germany and Spain, for the current analytical purposes and in large
part because of legal priority granted to it, a negligible amount of
electrical energy from renewable energy sources was curtailed (within
the range of 0–2%) [56,57]. Following Table 2, Fig. 1 describes the
changes in the power capacity used to generate electrical energy by
detailing the power capacity profile at the start and end points of the
datasets detailed in Table 2.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Fig. 1 is the significant increase
in total power capacity following a relative increase in electrical energy
sourced from intermittent primary energy sources. Specifically, Spain
observed a 17% increase in total system power capacity over 12 years
and Germany observed a 27% increase in 8 years, 14.5 GW and
47.5 GW respectively. This increase was a result of a respective 11%
and 17% increase in intermittently sourced electrical energy genera-
tion. While prodigious amounts of wind and solar power capacity were
added in both countries, conventional fossil-fuel and nuclear power
capacity only marginally decreased regardless of a negligible change in
demand. This remarkable long-term trend is depicted in a more trans-
parent manner in Fig. 2.
3.3. Results
Following the discussion in Section 3.1, within existing electrical
grids decision makers operate in a high-dimensional option space. The
apparent historical decision to retain a majority of conventional power
Table 2
Summary of datasets used in the case study. Intermittents penetration reflects
the percentage of electrical energy generated by wind and solar primary energy
sources in the respective country (annual average). Spain refers to Peninsular
Spain only. Sources as follows. Spain: [58]. Germany: collated from the four
German transmission system operators [59–62].
Region Start date Length Resolution Intermittents penetration
End Start
Spain 1/1/2007 144 mo 10 min 20.1% 9.4%
Germany 1/1/2011 96 mo 60 min 30.0% 13.3%
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capacity regardless of a significant increase in renewables power ca-
pacity (depicted in Figs. 1 and 2) represented just one of the many
possible options decision makers had available to them. The original
option space contained many alternative transition pathways. In the
exploration of future grid possibilities, it is of primary importance to
describe the option space in a manner capable of informing a plurality
of decision makers each with different but equally relevant considera-
tions and concerns. Table 3 provides a set of statistical information
reflecting challenges which would need to be overcome by decision
makers. Specifically, it describes energy and power dimensions of the
predicted worst annual failure event. This event represents the crux of
what would need to be overcome in an electrical grid with high inter-
mittents penetration. In reality, each point of data in Table 3 is the basis
of a unique scenario characterized by different functional assumptions
about social demand. Each of these functional assumptions entails dif-
ferent structural implications. To restate the assumptive basis, the en-
semble of anticipations described imagines future electrical grids where
intermittent renewable primary energy sources are used to generate
electrical energy at a scale equal to 100% of the present-year electrical
grid demand.
In a closed, national and centralized electrical grid where electrical
energy is sourced predominantly from intermittent primary energy
sources, three categories of options are available to decision makers
planning to accommodate the expected worst annual failure event
(detailed in Table 3). Firstly, reserve conventional power capacity may
be retained. Secondly, social demands for electrical energy may, either
forcibly or willingly, undergo major change. Thirdly, a major addition
of storage capacity may be made. Figs. 1 and 2 in Section 3.2 indicated
that the first option – retention of reserve conventional power capacity
– was apparently the one historically taken both in Germany and Spain.
From Table 3 we could say that a majority of conventional power
Fig. 1. Structural reading of the electrical grid power capacity composition. Refer to Table 2 for the points in time associated with the differing intermittents
penetration levels (i.e. the Start and End points). Sources as follow. Spain: [58,63,64]. Germany: [59–62,65].
Fig. 2. Electrical energy generation and growth in power capacities over time
during the Spanish and German renewable energy transitions. Additional
characteristic data available in Fig. 1. The generation data overlay is presented
at a monthly resolution for Spain and yearly until 2008 for Germany, monthly
thereafter. Sources as follow. Spain: [63,66]. Germany: [49,64,67].
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capacity would need to be retained if the first option is to be taken in
isolation (i.e. we expect failure events at a power magnitude equal to
that of the entire electrical grid). It's also worth noting, however, that
the first option largely defeats the decoupling purpose of a renewables
transition. The second option – changes in social demand profiles – is
inevitable. That said, the nature of the changes and the degree policy
guidance will play is unclear. Following the previous discussion of
socio-technological imaginaries and technological promise, the second
option typically but unfortunately takes a backstage position in con-
temporary energy transition efforts [68,69]. This is due to the fact that
contemporary energy transition efforts are primarily concerned with
quantified change of the structural composition of the electrical grid
[70]. In contrast to the first and second options, the third option –
storage – has gained significant traction in recent years [39].
Following the generation gaps presented in Table 3, estimations of
the monetary costs and greenhouse gas externalities associated with the
use of Li-ion batteries as utility-scale electrical grid storage are provided
in Table 4. (The decision to explore the utility-scale use of Li-ion bat-
teries is justified in Section 2.1 and in Section 4.) Working as a peak
electricity provider, the unsubsidized and levelized cost of Li-ion bat-
teries is currently estimated to be between $285 and $581/MWh [71].
The greenhouse gas emissions resulting from manufacturing of just the
lithium batteries (i.e. none of the other required infrastructure) is es-
timated to be between 33 and 172 tons CO2-eq/MWh [72]. An example
of interpreting Table 4 follows. If a Germany highly concerned with
national security aimed to guarantee 95% of their annual average 100%
intermittents electrical energy generation at a 99% confidence level,
they should expect to prepare contingency storage capable of providing
22 TWh with an 84 GW peak output. Table 4 contextualizes the
structural costs of that storage related to the use of utility-scale Li-ion
batteries to be between $6.4 bn and $13 bn. In terms of greenhouse gas
emissions, the structural costs of storage are expected to be between
0.74 Gt and 3.9 Gt CO2-eq.
For context, the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in just the
manufacturing of the Li-ion batteries used as peakers and described in
Table 4 are on the order of the entirety of greenhouse gas emissions for
their respective countries (in 2016, 0.9 Gt and 0.3 Gt CO2-eq. for all
sectors including indirect emissions1 for Germany and Spain, respec-
tively) [73]. While the financial costs are substantial, they are rather
minor in relation to the cost of replacing existing conventional power
capacity with renewable alternatives assuming current price points
[74]. It should lastly be noted that Table 4 is a naïve interpretation of
Table 3. The Table 4 estimates do not take into account additional
storage capacity required to avoid damaging depths of discharge, ad-
ditional additive factors such as imperfect round-trip efficiency, self-
discharge rates, climate control of the storage facilities and compen-
sation for transmission losses and subtractive factors such as time-of-use
tariffs (−15 to 25%) and other grid flexibility measures [75]. Though
many of these factors are functional decisions of confidence and guar-
antee, decisions that electrical grid operators make as they align
themselves in the option space described by Tables 3 and 4, these
factors serve to compound the quantitative estimates provided in this
section and are beyond the scope of this work.
4. The plausibility of a quick scaling-up of intermittents
In recent years in Germany and Spain there have been fleeting
moments where nearly all electrical energy consumed was derived from
renewable primary energy sources. Clearly the combination of weather
patterns and energy demand was remarkably favorable at these mo-
ments. Indeed, over the course of the past year, the average generation
from intermittents for Germany and Spain was between 20% and 30%
for both countries. This figure is a far cry less than totality. Considering
these facts, it is important to then realize that the continued policy
mandate to increase renewables power capacity results from largely
unquestioned assumptions of social practice and inflexible functional
Table 3
Statistical description of annual ‘worst events’ in two imagined electrical grids where 100% of
the electrical energy is generated from intermittent sources (an annual average of combined
wind and solar). The insight presented is helpful for informing subjective decisions within the
option space. The power gap is characterized as both an absolute level (in GW) and a relative
level (percentage of the total electrical energy demanded but unfulfilled). The energy gap
described refers to a singular, continuous period where less than the guaranteed level of total
electrical energy was fulfilled by intermittent energy sources. See Appendix A for extended
discussion on the underlying statistical methods.
1 Indirect emissions do not, in this case, include land-use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCFs).
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demand. From a historical perspective, modern society demands a flow
of electrical energy at a remarkably high confidence level. An ideolo-
gical assumption has been made that, rather than change our social
practices of consumption, the supply of electrical energy derived from
renewable primary energy sources should increase.
Relatively few analyses attempt to estimate potential storage re-
quirements in a fully renewable electrical grid. This is a major oversight
in the discourse since solving that problem is given the highest priority
by many supranational interest groups [i.a. 39,41,76]. Those analyses
that do attempt to estimate general storage requirements are, however,
compatible with the average results presented in Table 3. For example,
assuming that grid expansions are limited to the national scale and that
no backup generation is provided, [77] estimate that the European
Union would require between 7 and 30 days of storage to accommodate
shares of 90% or more of intermittent renewable energy. The results are
also comparable with the specific analysis for Germany by Kuhn [78],
which predicts a requirement of storage power output on the order of
53 GW by 2050.
Following the results in Table 4 and using the United Nation's [79]
population estimates, while planning for the expected annual worst
event in the most extreme scenario (99% confidence interval, 95%
guaranteed) the anticipated levelized costs of Li-ion battery storage
backup supply are on the order of 37–73 USD per capita for Spain and
77–157 USD per capita for Germany. These costs are relatively minor in
relation to other expenses in the renewable energy transition. On the
other hand, annual greenhouse gas emissions from lithium battery
manufacturing are on the order of 4–21 tons CO2-eq per capita for Spain
and 9–47 tons CO2-eq per capita for Germany. These figures are majorly
concerning. Putting these emissions into context, the figures are be-
tween 0.5x and 3x of the 2015 per capita greenhouse gas emissions
(Kyoto basket) for both Spain and Germany [80]. The biophysical im-
plications of the considered transition, even when considering coarse
assessments, include substantial reason for concern.
More concerning than the emissions figures, however, is the mag-
nitude of lithium that would be required. When considering the con-
servative functional options in Table 3 (99% confidence interval, 95%
guaranteed), the use of Li-ion storage that would be required in the
anticipated 100% intermittent electricity system already represents
some 7% (Spain) and 13.5% (Germany) of the world's proven lithium
reserves and 4x (Spain) and 15x (Germany) the current annual pro-
duction volume of lithium, or 12x (Spain) and 43x (Germany) the
current annual production volume of lithium used in the production of
batteries [72,81–83]. Considering that the effective lifespan of a Li-ion
battery is on the order of 5–10 years [76,84], one can conclude that
utility scale Li-ion battery electricity storage is not currently a large-
scale environmentally feasible or economically viable option for de-
veloped nations. While the use of utility scale Li-ion battery electricity
storage may possibly be desirable domestically, given the anticipated
levels of extraction it is highly doubtful to be desirable from a global
perspective. Indeed, contemporary levels of lithium extraction alone are
already highly contentious [85]. From the anticipated levels of lithium
extraction, major desirability concerns over social and environmental
justice would be anticipated [86]. These are all concerning points given
the reliance on Li-ion by major supranational energy outlooks.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, for example, estimates that an eye-
popping 1291 GW of new battery capacity (primarily but not ex-
clusively Li-ion) will be added by 2050. 30% of that capacity is assumed
to be driven by Europe where a 77% portion is expected to go to utility-
scale batteries [41].
Naturally, as intermittent electricity generation penetrates the
electrical grid, system administrators have structural options alter-
native to Li-ion. One could import energy via Pan-European inter-
connectors i.e. increase the range of effective spatial smoothing.
Alternatively, one could build or maintain dispatchable backup con-
ventional power plants (the current solution). One could also majorly
overbuild intermittent renewables power capacity. Even spatial
smoothing within a country's borders, however, will prove difficult.
Kies et al. [57] estimate that, in Germany, even with considerably im-
proved spatial smoothing and relatively available high voltage trans-
mission lines, curtailment in a 100% renewables scenario may be forced
into the realm of 60–80%. In their simulations Kies et al. [57] estimate
that utilization factors for wind farms in Northern Germany (where a
majority of the wind power capacity is currently located in Germany)
would be on the order of 2%. This future is drastically different from the
Table 4
Interpreted impacts for Table 3, where electrical energy discrepancies (unfulfilled guarantees)
are fulfilled by Li-ion batteries. Monetary figures refer to the unsubsidized levelized cost of
storage from Lazard [71], which includes capital, operation and maintenance, charging, taxes
and extended warranty costs. Monetary figures in USD. Greenhouse gas figures refer only to
the manufacturing of the battery, using range estimates from a review of the literature [72].
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present reality – current curtailment is negligible. It presents an addi-
tional complication with respect to the major scaling-up of alternatives
in the electrical grid.
Lastly, there will always exist special circumstances which allow
some entities to pursue transition pathways alternative to the ones
described for Germany and Spain. Denmark, for example, has received
widespread critical acclaim in recent years and in response to its re-
newable energy transition successes. However, while Denmark itself
has no significant hydropower potential, it sits on the doorstep of a
cooperative Norway and a cooperative Sweden which together have
nearly 70% of Europe's hydropower (maximum storage capacity) [87].
Every year there are multiple weeks where Denmark imports on
average 60-80% of the electrical energy it consumes [88]. The Denmark
model is not easily reproducible. There will always be special cases and
outliers. Successes aside – and there have been many – there remain
major functional hurdles between our present society and a future one
powered on renewable electrical energy.
Despite major functional hurdles, physical-technical and economic
models continue to dominate the energy analysis discourse and related
decision-making processes. Notwithstanding, there exists widespread
acknowledgement that such models are poor predictors of the future
[89–92]. Assessments of systemic factors affecting the adoption of
transformative energy technologies find many reasons for their poor
predictive power. One such reason is that technology adopters are not
homo economicus and are motivated by much more than financial con-
siderations [89,93]. Concerning these points, quantitative story-telling
suggests moving away from a discussion based on ‘matters of fact’ and
towards a discussion about ‘matters of concern’.
This shift in analytical focus from fact to concern is non-trivial,
however. In contrast to the assessment of a matter of fact, an analysis of
a matter of concern is necessarily based on multiple, non-equivalent
and non-reducible quality checks. One major issue with socio-techno-
logical imaginaries is that they are often shaped more by narratives and
endorsed storylines than biophysical reality [94,95]. In this sense, an
analysis of a matter of concern relevant for decision makers should
include a quality check on its feasibility. In the example of quantitative
story-telling proposed in this paper, we illustrated that analysts should
be able to assess how much electrical energy can be produced by the
different functional categories of production (base-load, peak-load, in-
termittents) when matching demand across space and time. This ana-
lysis of biophysical congruence is independent from the price of a kWh.
We also made a call for analysts to discuss how to define a relation
between power capacity and gross supply (i.e. utilization factor, power
load, or, the characterization based on production factors per typology).
Depending on the level of centralization of the proposed electrical grid,
analysts should explore how much energy must be stored in order to
integrate a given quantity of intermittents in the grid in order to bal-
ancing demand and supply. They should address storage loss profiles
and the spatial/temporal distribution of dispatched, stored energy.
They should also consider degradation rates of storage infrastructure
and embodied inputs in the manufacturing and installation of that
storage infrastructure.
In addition to a feasibility check, the analysis of a matter of concern
should be based on quality checks on desirability and viability.
Exploring that point, a desirability check requires establishing a bridge
between a technical analysis and the implications of proposed changes
on the patterns of consumption in the society. This type of analysis has
not been presented in this paper, though it is developed in the activities
of the MAGIC project. How will the proposed changes affect the ex-
pression of the current mix of social practices? How will they affect the
quality of life in terms of material standard of living and social activ-
ities? The establishment of this bridge is essential. Technical informa-
tion will remain useless if the technical analysis of feasibility is not
coupled to an analysis of its policy relevance, i.e. the implications of
choices in terms of desirability for society. Lastly, an economic viability
check implies that those solutions that have been identified as feasible
and desirable by the society (using non-economic narratives and story-
tellings) are verified in relation to their reasonable chances of economic
success, in order to be able to identify effective policies.
In this paper we attempted to show the importance of considering
more than one lens at a time in order to obtain a better framing of
sustainability issues. We used the discussion on alternative sources of
electrical energy as a case study and learning-type story. For reasons of
length, we focused primarily on one lens (biophysical feasibility). This
choice does not imply that the other lenses are less important. The
message of quantitative story-telling is that we need to learn how to
integrate the great diversity of available knowledge claims relevant to
the understanding of a wicked problem. To achieve this result we
should avoid as much as possible the hegemonization of narratives and
hero-type story-tellings [19,26]. Instead, a diversity of framings of a
given issue is essential in order to reduce the unavoidable generation of
‘hypocognition’ [96] associated with any representation of a problem or
solution. As a consequence, more informed and equitable choices may
be made.
5. Conclusions
The analysis provided in this manuscript points at an excessive re-
liance on economic narratives as one of the possible causes leading to
the underestimation of the technical and biophysical hurdles in the
implementation of renewable energy transition policies. This manu-
script proposes that discussions about a future, completely distinct
energy system should be complemented by other types of narratives.
We suggest moving away from a ‘Yes, we can!’ mode of discussion in
which the solution is to set a business models with the goal of achieving
a certain set of normalized expectations. We also suggest moving away
from a mode of discussion which assumes that ‘no matter the problem’
human ingenuity and the invisible hands of the market will be capable
of solving it. Instead, it may be advantageous to start exploring a mode
of discussion based on ‘Houston, we've had a problem.’
In this sense, the quantitative story-telling method proposal does
not claim to provide uncontested ‘facts’ to the process of deliberation
over sustainability policies. As a matter of fact, during the activities of
the MAGIC project, we have been consistently confronted by strong
believers of a quick decarbonization through a massive and rapid de-
ployment of intermittent electricity sources – supporters of the ‘eco-
nomics of techno-scientific promises’ [97]. This disagreement is per-
fectly legitimate. Any analysis of the possible evolution of a complex
adaptive system can always be contested by challenging specific tech-
nical assumptions. However, critiques of this nature should not be used
to avoid the discussion of the proposed concerns. In fact, a discussion
about the plausibility of policies should not be focused on ‘what may
happen’ but rather on reaching an agreement on ‘what cannot happen’.
Numerous learning-type stories should be included to balance hero-type
stories [26]. In our stakeholder experience in the MAGIC project, those
convinced that technological innovation represents a panacea in the
modern sustainable energy crisis tend to avoid discussing concerns
about the plausibility of policies currently proposed. The usefulness of
the quantitative story-telling methodology does not depend on whether
the analysis presented should be considered as a fact. Rather, its use-
fulness depends on whether the concerns raised provide a sobering
reminder about the risks of bad planning. Quantitative story-telling is
about learning how to handle ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ that is dis-
turbing our visions and aspirations for the future. As stated by Rayner,
the systemic refusal to handle uncomfortable knowledge is the main
mechanism of the social construction of ignorance in science and en-
vironmental policy discourses [15].
In view of the analysis presented here, the descriptive and pre-
scriptive discourse surrounding the contemporary European renewable
energy transition seems to be characterized by a critical lack of holistic
(structural and functional) analyses. Indeed the term ‘energy transition’
is nearly always used in reference to a change in the structural
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composition of primary energy supply [2]. Unfortunately, over the past
century, our economies have become so intertwined with oil and gas
that substituting fossil fuels will take an Olympic effort. This does not
entail that a transition away from fossil energy cannot be done. We, as a
society, will have to do it either willing or not. However, it is essential
to acknowledge that when dealing with a complex pattern of produc-
tion and consumption (i.e. the metabolic pattern of social-ecological
systems) it is unthinkable to imagine a transition based on the main-
tenance of the same pattern of consumption (required for the stabili-
zation of existing institutions and social practices) coupled to the in-
troduction of a new pattern of production [98]. That is, in order to be
capable of using alternative sources of electrical energy we must change
the existing institutions and social practices. Society as a whole must
move to a different integrated pattern of production and consumption.
This is not an easy task and above all this is not a task that can be
achieved by technological change alone. Any change in the existing
pattern of production and consumption of energy will require adjust-
ments in both the existing power structure and existing social relations.
In relation to this point, the natural inertia of social systems may ex-
plain why, globally, fossil fuel subsidies still outpace renewables sub-
sidies 4:1 [99]. The massive replacement of fossil fuel as an energy
carrier in modern economy is a task so complex that it will require an
exercise of extreme humility by those attempting to analyze it. This
transition cannot be predicted and controlled by simple technocratic
planning nor left to the invisible hands of the market in accordance
with neo-liberal ideologies. In a situation where the characterization of
the future is highly uncertain and highly contested, it is not advisable to
operate under command and control or put blind faith in the market
forces. Otherwise, we risk propelling ourselves headlong and blindfold
into a situation of structural-functional mismatch.
The general consideration of the factors discussed in this paper
suggests that the scale and scope of the modern world's energy power
systems has become so huge that there is no primarily technological or
engineering fix to the problem of a renewable energy transition on a
timescale relevant to the forces that mandate that transition. Society
must re-define itself in order to be able to produce and consume energy
within a different metabolic pattern. This discussion must be based on
the simultaneous consideration of several non-equivalent narratives.
Tables 3 and 4 presented just one of many ways of introducing a re-
lational analysis approach with functional and structural considerations
made together. This approach may provide a more holistic vision by
informing the discussion over potential consequences of proposed
solutions.
The experience created by a quick deployment of intermittents elec-
trical energy supply in Germany and Spain suggests that a primarily
structural analysis does not adequately speak towards the feasibility, via-
bility or desirability of decisions. When considering the implications of a
massive and rapid build-up of an electrical energy generation system built
around wind and solar primary energy sources there are several concerns
be addressed. For the building of a dependable backup generation or
storage, society would need a huge supply of material for the batteries,
panels, infrastructures and transmission lines. When considering the costs
of this transition, it is not even sure that this task is feasible. It is also not
clear that the task would represent a low-carbon solution, especially if it
must be implemented in just two or three decades. Of course, these
statements do not mean that we do not have to fight for alternatives. They
do mean, however, that in our search for a more sustainable energy system
we must be careful to not filter out uncomfortable knowledge claims about
the existence of potential problems. This point is important because of the
hegemonic role played by economic narratives in the definition of policies.
Indeed, the uncontested endorsement of economic story-telling represents
a formidable filter against uncomfortable knowledge about the sustain-
ability predicament [100].
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Appendix A
A.1. Quantitative analysis
In this appendix the methods for the creation of all non-trivial figures and tables are elaborated.
A.1.1. Fig. 1
Data directly from sources listed except for Germany where final power capacities for 2018 are forecasted using ENTSOE-E growth ratios applied
to the 2015 Eurostat values. Furthermore, the following aggregations were made:
Spain. ‘Oil/Gas’ represents ‘fuel’, ‘gas’ and ‘combined cycle’ categories. ‘Hydro’ includes ‘Hydro: Mixed Conventional’, ‘Hydro’, and ‘Other Hydro’.
‘Solar’ includes ‘Solar: Photovoltaic’ and ‘Solar: Thermal’.
Germany. ‘Coal’ includes ‘Hard Coal (Anthracite)’ and ‘Brown Coal (Lignite)’. ‘Wind’ includes ‘Wind: Onshore’ and ‘Wind: Offshore’.
A.1.2. Fig. 2
‘Intermittent Renewables’ includes all forms of wind and solar power capacity. ‘Other Renewables’ includes all other renewables save inter-
mittents (hydro, biofuel, waste, geothermal etc.). ‘Conventional’ includes all non-renewable energy sources (oil, gas, coal, nuclear etc.). Generation
data is net production measured at the power plant (i.e. before e.g. distribution losses). For Germany, generation data is at a yearly resolution until
2008, thereafter it is at a monthly resolution, due to data availability constraints. For Spain, generation data is at a monthly resolution for the
complete timeframe.
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A.1.3. Tables 3 and 4
Data curation. For several reasons, portions of the Spain and Germany electricity production datasets were interpolated. Overall, interpolated values
represent only a minor portion not expected to significantly impact the results. In summary, 5.3% of the timestamps in the Spain dataset and 0.2% of
the values in the Germany dataset contain interpolated values. The first pane of Fig. 3 and the first pane of Fig. 4 describe the frequency of the
interpolated values in time. A piecewise cubic hermite interpolating polynomial (PCHIP) was selected for interpolation due to its preservation of
monotonicity – it is not prone to exaggerating oscillations as e.g. a standard cubic spline interpolation may. The following list provides statistics for
Fig. 3. Summary of Spain dataset describing: (i) temporal location of interpolated values representing 5.3% of the total; (ii) full break-down of electricity con-
sumption 2007-2018 inclusive; (iii) relative generation mix between the three functional categories described in Section 2.3. Data for the second two panes is
reported at a monthly resolution where the underlying data is at a 10-min resolution.
Fig. 4. Summary of Germany dataset describing: (i) temporal location of interpolated values representing 0.2% of the total; (ii) full break-down of electricity
consumption 2011–2018 inclusive; (iii) relative generation mix between the three functional categories described in Section 2.3. Data for the second two panes is
reported at a monthly resolution where the underlying data is hourly.
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the relative breakdown of missing or discarded values:
1 The following comment amending instances where not all accounting categories are reported (incomplete data). Spain: 3.6% (22,713; minor
concentration bias between 3 h and 4 h); Germany: 0.2% (155).
2 Amending the unlikely autocorrelation between at least one of the individuated generation time series (set of windows ranging from 1 to 6
timestamps; allowance of 10% maximum delta between windows excepting in comparisons between windows where at least one of the windows
averages less than 10 MW). For example, for Spain on 11 November 2007 between 12h20 and 12h40 hydroelectric generation trembles nearly
1500% and all other sources of generation are zeroed – this is unrealistic, the data is incorrect. Spain: 1.3% (8478); Germany: 0.0% (0).
3 High standard error between reported total demand and calculated total demand (sum of individuated generation sources). Errors more than
1 ± 0.25 discarded. The vast majority lie within 1 ± 0.01. Spain: 0.3% (2151); Germany: 0.0% (0).
Lastly, in the circumstance multiple, distinct values were reported for the same time period, the first reported value was kept. This issue only
presented itself with the Spain dataset.
Statistical procedure. The following list details the general statistical procedure used to calculate the confidence levels and guarantees in Tables 3 and
4.
1 Calculate the percentage of the total generation sourced from intermittents (wind or solar) for each observation.
2 Find the yearly mean percentage generated for each point in time by taking the centered rolling mean with a one-year window for each year.
3 For each observation, calculate the guaranteed percentage for each of the guarantee levels (0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 0.95) by multiplying the mean
generation by each of the guarantee levels.
4 Calculate the discrepancy between the intermittents generation and the guaranteed percentage by multiplying the total production (power) by
the intermittents generation percentage less the guaranteed percentage.
5 Locate all time intervals of the discrepancy values with an average under the guaranteed percentage (i.e. using a rolling sum method).
6 Calculate, in hours, the length of all located time intervals.
7 Calculate the maximum subarray (the contiguous subarray of the time series with the largest sum) of the hourly discrepancies. Calculate the
additive inverse of the sum of that number, which represents the energy gap of the ‘most significant’ located time interval. Report this value in the
table.
8 For each year, calculate the mean, max, min, standard deviation (‘n−1’ method i.e. sample not population) and standard error of the located
time interval lengths.
9 Report the 50% confidence level in the table.
10 Calculate and report the 75% and 99% confidence levels using 1-tailed normal z-scores of 0.68 and 2.33, respectively.
Nota bene. It should be noted that the standard error and standard deviation methods were run over low population sizes (the number of complete
years in the dataset). For Spain n = 12, for Germany n = 8. With regard to the relatively low n value, readers are reminded that the nature of this
work's analysis is to illustrate the methodology described previously and highlight plausible concerns involved.
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